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Preface 
This paper is written as part of the research project Autonomy, Transparency and 
Management – Three Reform Programs in Health Care (ATMhealth) at the Stein 
Rokkan Centre for Social Research.  
The aim of ATMhealth is to study such processes of reform and change within the 
Norwegian health care sector, make comparisons with Sweden, Denmark and other 
countries, and estimate the consequences of such reforms. Three research areas are 
emphasized:   
 
1) AUTONOMY. The ambition to establish autonomous organizational units, 
with a focus on the health enterprise.  
2) TRANSPARENCY. The dynamics involved in the strive for transparency, 
exemplified by the introduction of still more detailed instruments for monitoring 
of performance and quality, as well as patient’s rights to choose and be 
informed.  
3) MANAGEMENT. To establish a more professional and distinct managerial role 
at all levels is a major ambition for most of the recent reform programs.  
 
A comparative research design is employed – regional, cross-national and global – in 
order to analyze the relationship between reform activities, organizational changes and 
service provision. The aims are to:  
• Generate research on the preconditions for change in health care by the means 
of comparative research  
• General competence development in organization and management of health 
care  
• assist the health institutions in their efforts to improve service delivery and 
create more innovative structures for organization and management.  
The funding for ATMhealth comes from the Norwegian Research Council and more 
specifically FIFOS,  Research fund for innovation and renewal in the public sector. The 
purpose of this fund is to create a concerted, multidisciplinary , long-term research 
effort , in order to encourage organizational changes and innovation in the public 
sector, and create the common solutions for the public sector of the future.  
 
Haldor Byrkjeflot 
project director  
 
 
More information about ATMhealth at: 
 http://www.rokkansenteret.uib.no/vr/rokkan/ATM/index.html
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Abstract 
 
The paper presents a theoretical framework for studying reforms and organizational 
change; 1) change as the product of reformers’ intentions, 2) change in institutionalized 
norms and habits and 3) change as a consequence of strategic maneuvering. These 
perspectives highlight various kinds of actor constellations and reform processes that 
may facilitate or hamper regime change. We make use of such perspectives in an analysis 
and tentative comparison of recent reforms of the hospital sector and of higher 
education in Norway. A common characteristic of the two reforms is that they aim at 
regime change and increased outside control of knowledge based occupations. The 
prospects for regime change is seen in the ambitions to move away from political–
professional regimes in which professional communities and political hierarchies are 
predominant towards a regime where both the state and the market actors (or models) 
may play stronger roles. The basic idea in both cases is that regime change should 
promote new policy content in order to improve quality and efficiency and to serve 
patients and students. The evidence so far suggests that the relationship between regime 
characteristics and policy content is quite loose, however. Whereas the hospital sector 
seems to experience regime change without (significant) policy change, the higher 
education sector may be headed for policy change without regime change. 
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Sammendrag 
 
Notatet introduserer tre perspektiver som kan brukes til å studere organisasjonsendring 
og reformer, 1) endring som konsekvens av planlegging og  iverksetting av 
reformintensjoner, 2) endring som institusjonell endring, dvs. framvekst av nye normer 
og vaner og 3) endring som konsekvens av strategisk manøvrering. Disse perspektivene 
bringer fokus på ulike typer drivkrefter som kan tenkes å fremme og motvirke radikale 
endringer. Med dette utgangspunktet presentes en analyse av to store reformer i norsk 
offentlig sektor; eierskapsreformen i sykehusene og kvalitetsreformen i høyere 
utdanning. Et fellestrekk er at ambisjonsnivået er høyt; ikke bare skal det skje store 
endringer i organisasjonsstrukturen men også i politikkens innhold. De profesjonelle 
gruppene skal i mindre grad få styre seg selv, makten til å bestemme over 
tjenesteproduksjonen skal flyttes fra de profesjonelle til bredere samfunnsinteresser og 
brukerne av tjenestene. Kvalitetsheving er det sentrale målet i høyere utdanning, mens 
ambisjonene for helsevesenet er at det skal bli mer pasientorientert og effektivt. For å 
oppnå dette trengs det regimeendring, dvs at det skal slippes til nye aktører, samtidig 
som  holdningene og styringsstrukturen også skal endres. Det er for tidlig å evaluere 
reformene, men erfaringene så langt tyder på at sammenhengen mellom 
organisasjonsregime og politikkens innhold er nokså løs. Mens sykehus-sektoren er 
preget av regime-skifte uten at politikken endres vesentlig, ser det ut som høyere 
utdanning er i ferd med å bli reformert innholdsmessig uten regime-endring.  
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Introduction 
 
The objective of this paper is to develop a conceptual approach and tentatively analyze 
two comprehensive public sector reforms of the hospital sector and of higher education 
in Norway. Both reforms aim at regime change. If we look at the main policy 
documents it appears that policy makers have assumed that regime change constitute a 
necessary condition for goal attainment. A common characteristic of the two reforms is 
the attempt to bring knowledge based occupations – the medical profession and other 
health professionals in the hospital sector, and the academic profession in higher 
education – under better outside control, both political control by the central 
government and consumer control by the users of the services (be it patients, students 
or consumers). Thus improved political steering, more efficient organization – including 
introduction of market mechanisms – and better institutional management are expected 
to result in higher quality health care and more empowered patients. Similarly regime 
change is considered to be conducive to better learning processes and education for 
students in higher education. 
Although it may be quite clear what kind of regime politicians want to leave behind, 
it is not equally clear what change they are aiming at. In order to better analyze political 
priorities, we shall therefore first present and discuss the regime concept applied in this 
analysis. Next we give a brief description of the main reform elements in the two 
sectors, and point out the main features of the regime changes that policy makers hope 
to achieve. Then we formulate assumptions about the reform process based on a 
number different theoretical perspectives focusing on various factors that may drive and 
shape the reform process. The three perspectives – rational planning under conditions 
of bounded rationality, bureaucratic rule following and political games – point at three 
different kinds of drivers of reform processes that may facilitate or hamper regime 
change in various ways. By using different perspectives we address three broad classes 
of ideas about political reforms and organizational change: change as the product of 
reformers’ intentions, of institutionalized norms and habits and of strategic 
maneuvering by actors involved in and affected by the reforms. The purpose is not to 
test alternative mutually excluding hypotheses entailed by the perspectives about likely 
reform outcomes and their causes. Neither is it an attempt to demonstrate in the spirit 
of Allison (1971) how different conceptual lenses produce different, although equally 
valid accounts of the reform process. Our purpose is based on the assumption that the 
three perspectives represent major drivers that are likely to affect complex reform 
processes and they are therefore all needed to understand the dynamics of the 
processes. Thus the focus is as much on how the drivers interact as on the effect of 
each individual driver.  
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Regime change 
Standard definitions of ‘regime’ share a double meaning. They usually refer both to 
social structures like a form of government and a constellation of actors that constitute 
a specific government in power. Simply put, a regime may therefore be a group of actors 
and a set of rules.1 However, we share Weber’s (1978) idea that lest it be coercive or 
manipulative, power needs to be based on shared beliefs in its legitimacy by the 
governing and the governed. Belief systems therefore are the third element in our 
regime concept.  
The following analysis of regimes shall deal with how power is wielded, conflicts are 
handled and agreements made under a given set of rules and actor constellations. 
Furthermore we shall focus on how these social relations are affected when actors 
and/or rules change. We shall take as our point of departure that public service sectors 
such as education, health care and social services have their particular forms of 
variation. These variations are based on the very simple notion that the regimes in 
principle find themselves within a field of tension constituted by three different social 
relations into which decision makers enter and that are crucial in determining power 
relationships and rules of the game within the organization (Bleiklie 1997). In order to 
give an overview of this approach we first present a typology of public sector regimes 
based on which actors are most influential on organizational decisions. 
First, public service provision takes place in organizations where a basic characteristic 
is that decisions are made within a hierarchical order and where organization members 
are oriented towards rules, like they have been described by Peter Blau in his classical 
study of an American employment agency (Blau 1963). We may call this kind of 
organizations for service hierarchies. An apt example is made by social insurance services 
which are distributed according to relatively clear cut rules and where the interpretation 
and application of general rules occupy a central position in the decision making process 
(Solheim 1992). In public hospitals and universities this logic entails that the fact that 
they are part of the civil service becomes prominent. As rules and regulations are 
formulated by politicians and administrative superiors, these are the dominant actors in 
defining the mission and operation of the organization. 
Secondly, the growth of public services (paralleled by the emergence of the modern 
service economy) in the areas of health, social services and education constitute a 
significant development of modern welfare states during the last fifty years. This was a 
field of public activity that was characterized by professions and tended to be organized 
in a way that departs form our standard image of public bureaucracies (Esping-
Andersen 1990, Ramsøy and Kjølsrød 1986). Rather than being governed by rules 
within the framework of hierarchical organizations, decisions concerning service 
provision are governed by communities of professionals or by various professional 
groups that compete and bargain among themselves about the distribution of resources 
                                                 
1 Webster American Heritage Dictionary lists the following definitions of ‘regime’: 1 a) A form of government: a 
fascist regime. b) A government in power; administration: suffered under the new regime. 2. A prevailing 
social system or pattern. 3. The period during which a particular administration or system prevails. 4. A regulated 
system, as of diet and exercise; a regimen (Webster 2000).  
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and authority within the organization. Professional service communities are typical of 
modern health and education institutions in which the content of the services – whether 
it be diagnosing, planning and execution of treatment programs or curriculum planning 
and the execution of teaching programs – is determined by professionals (Abbott 1988, 
Bleiklie 1997, Johnson 1972, Løchen 1985, Rubinstein and Lasswell 1966).  
Thirdly public service providing organizations enter into relationships with more or 
less clearly delineated groups of users. The users may influence decision making in 
various ways. One kind of service providing organization has been dubbed «street level 
bureaucracy» by Michael Lipsky (1976, 1980). Street level bureaucracies are 
characterized by the fact that the relationship between service provider and users 
(clients, customers, students, patients) of the service is extensive. Service providers have 
on the other hand relatively little contact with their superiors or colleagues, at the same 
time as they enjoy considerable discretion in their decision making. Street level 
bureaucracy is a kind of organization that distributes services to clients who often have 
few resources and no alternative ways of obtaining access to vital services such as 
economic support, housing or employment. Social workers, teachers and policemen are 
typical representatives of street level bureaucrats.  
To the extent that decisions about services are made during the interaction between 
service providers and users, the outcome will depend on the interests and resources at 
the disposal of the parties involved and what strategies they follow. In the terms of 
Hirschman (1970) the only way in which they can wield power, therefore, is by using 
voice, i.e. some kind of political or social pressure, and the interaction between users and 
service providers is often characterized by interest based struggle and conflicts (Bleiklie 
1997, Brown 1981, Offerdal 1986, Prottas 1979). The alternative form of power is exit, 
i.e. a situation in which power is wielded through consumer choice, and where 
dissatisfied users express their concern and try to obtain better services by leaving their 
current service provider and seek a new one. This kind of service relationship is typically 
associated with non-public services operating on the market. However, since the 1980s 
public authorities in Western countries have tried to introduce and experiment with 
quasi-market mechanisms by outsourcing, use of vouchers or other mechanisms for 
increasing competition between service providers and enhancing consumer choice and 
exit opportunities for users.  
This move has been propelled by an ideological shift regarding how public 
administration in general and public services in particular ought to be organized as well 
as by new ideas about the organization of private enterprises in a service and knowledge 
based economy – both of which emphasized a strengthened and more active consumer 
orientation than previously (Myklebust 2001, Pollitt 1993). Whether we talk about street 
level bureaucracies or modern service industries a core idea is that service quality to a 
large extent is determined in the process of interaction between service provider and 
users. The two parties confront one another on a service arena where decisions service 
providers make at least in principle are affected by what opportunities users have to use 
voice and exit options and how they exercise those options. Although it is difficult to 
imagine a pure market or consumer dominated regime, its position as an ideal has been 
strengthened as part of the general strengthening of neo-liberalist ideals in public 
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services and increased the attention of public services to what they perceive as 
consumer needs. 
The purpose of this typology is to help conceptualize how different service ideals, 
actor constellations and rules of the game may dominate different parts of the public 
service providing apparatus. Furthermore it is meant to help identify service ideals that 
have dominated in different historical periods and represented shifting goals that policy 
makers have strived to achieve. 
The service ideal of the modern state as it gradually emerged from the 17th century 
was an emerging ideal based on classic bureaucratic norms, in which reliability and 
predictability were main concerns. Therefore, bureaucratic norms as they have been 
conceptualized by Max Weber (1978), constituted a dominant ideal, although there has 
always been a tension in modern bureaucracies between ‘the rule of law’ and ‘the rule of 
experts’. Certain areas of public activity, such as public hospitals and public universities 
have been the domain of academic professions since their establishment during the 19th 
century. If we take the first decades after the Second World War as a starting point these 
two public sectors have been dominated by service communities, as surgeons dominated 
hospitals and professors dominated higher education institutions (Clark 1987, Freidson 
1970, Scott et al. 2000, Starr 1982). Furthermore when formulating policy proposals 
policy makers solicited and listened to the advice of professionals. Finally professionals 
enjoyed a high level of trust and «expert» judgment tended to be respected as one that 
was based on scientific principles and therefore not steeped in self-interest. Since then 
several developments have contributed to the current policy of regime change in the 
two sectors. 
From the 1970s on this situation started to change. As hospitals grew and became 
more complex, new groups of highly educated health care professionals entered the 
hospitals, and traditional health professions such as nurses, were better educated than 
before. In universities the group of lecturers and associate professors grew rapidly and 
soon became the most numerous group of permanently employed academic staff.2 Both 
hospitals and universities were filled up by highly qualified personnel with little influence 
over their working conditions. Medical as well as academic establishments were 
criticized for being authoritarian, arrogant and unwilling to make their institutions more 
democratic. Gradually therefore, doctors had to share power with nurses and other 
health professionals, and professors with other academic staff, administrators, technical 
staff and students. Although professionals still dominated the institutions, power had 
become more dispersed, a wider array of professional occupations as well as non-
professional employees and students were granted representation on governing bodies. 
This was the outcome of the drive for democratization of existing regimes that affected 
both health care and higher education during the 1970s. However, criticism of the 
professional regimes did not stop there. 
Since the 1980s steep growth in both sectors, increasing political salience, rising costs 
and perceived inefficiency have further contributed to heavy criticism of health 
                                                 
2 University staff is permanently hired as civil servants in what might be considered a rough parallel to the American 
tenure system.  
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professionals and academics. Whereas health professionals have been criticized for 
being responsible for many of the problems inflicting the hospitals such as exploding 
costs and long waiting periods before admission for non-emergency procedures, 
academics have been criticized as responsible for making their universities into ivory 
towers unable to meet society’s need for relevant education and useful research without 
much sensitivity for the needs of society, students or patients. In these complaints is 
contained both a dissatisfaction with accountability and failure to control rising costs 
(particularly in the hospital sector) as well as with an inability to respond to the needs 
and concerns of the users of the services. Behind this criticism lies a fundamental shift 
in the trust enjoyed by professionals and academics. As the neo-liberal criticism, 
focusing on efficiency and consumer orientation was layered on top of the previous 
wave of democratic criticism; the legitimacy of professionals has been steadily 
weakened. From being regarded as servants of the greater good: representatives of 
knowledge who promoted the welfare of their users or of society at large, they now 
came to be regarded as members of interest groups that tended to exploit the needs of 
their users in order to promote their own particular economic gain. 
We interpret the present reforms as attempts at establishing new regimes in the 
Norwegian hospital and higher education sectors. The purpose of the regime change is 
to pull ‘power away from knowledge’, move the control or influence over the sectors 
away from professionals and achieve two objectives: a) better political control in terms 
of accountability and quality, b) greater responsiveness to the needs of users and greater 
user influence over institutions. In both sectors it seems clear that formal changes have 
been undertaken that are consistent with this ambition. However, it is not equally clear 
in which direction regime change is heading, since there is both a decentralizing move 
aiming at increased influence by users and a centralizing move aiming at increased central 
government control and more use of national standards and guidelines. In the next 
section we shall outline the reforms in the two sectors in more detail before we move 
on to analyzing the reform processes. 
The Reforms 
Chal lenges and solut ions  in  the heal th  
care  sector  
During the last years, health authorities in Norway and many other OECD-countries 
have been eager to initiate reforms. The Norwegian government has introduced several 
reforms during the last five years: new management systems that affect the relation 
between levels of government, new funding systems for hospitals and physicians outside 
hospitals, as well as patient contributions in a system where services used to be free.  
In its country report on the Norwegian economy 1998, OECD featured the health 
care system and the need for reform. The challenges were summarized as follows: acute 
shortage suggested by long waiting lists for hospital admission and the lack of physicians 
and other medical staff; the need to strike a balance between the requirements of a cost-
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efficient health care system on the one hand and the ambition to maintain a full-fledged 
health service in even the remotest parts of the country on the other; the risk of major 
expenditure increases in the future (OECD 1998). 
To meet these challenges, several reforms have been introduced, ranging from 
introduction of activity-based funding of somatic hospitals in 1997, via the 
establishment of five regional health enterprises in 2002 (Ot.prp. nr. 66 2000–2001) and 
the introduction of a patient rights legislation including the right to «free hospital 
choice» in 2001 (Ot.prp. nr. 12 (1998–99). Below the two most recent reforms are 
described. 
The patient rights act was introduced in January 1 2001 (Ot.prp. nr. 12 (1998–99), 
and the act will probably be revised in order to further enhance patient rights in the near 
future. One part of the act concerns patients’ right to choose provider, which grants 
patients the right to choose where he or she wants to be treated and thus create 
competition between hospitals. 
The Hospital reform, which was introduced 1 January 2002, transferred responsibility 
for public hospitals from the counties to the central government. Five regional health 
enterprises have been established, which in turn have organized hospitals under local 
health enterprises. These enterprises are of varying size and geographical span where 
some comprise just one hospital, while others organize hospitals as divisions under the 
health enterprise. 
The diversity of reforms chosen reflects the variety of goals in Norwegian health 
policy and the country-specific characteristics of the health care system. The reform 
initiatives include, simultaneously, both increased competition and reinforced planning. 
As planning and competition easily may be considered as conflicting policies, the 
challenge is to make these two elements work together.  
Establishing state owned health enterprises may be regarded as a tool with which the 
state  may strengthen its planning role as owner and manager, yet by seeking to 
strengthen patient rights, it has simultaneously emphasized patients’ individual rights to 
receive treatment and their freedom to choose hospital. The Hospital reform and the 
Patient rights act have the same goal: a more effective and efficient health care sector to 
the benefit of the patients. However, enablers and focus are different, and there may be 
tensions, conflicts and paradoxes involved in the two control concepts. For example, 
regional health enterprises may be forced to take economic and collective responsibility 
to handle efficiency and equity in health production, and this may be in conflict with 
individual patient rights.  
Chal lenges and responses in  Higher  
Educat ion 
Norwegian universities and state colleges are now engaged in one of the most 
comprehensive and fundamental reform processes in their history. The Quality reform 
may prove to break with a Norwegian tradition as careful and conservative reformer in the 
field of higher education (Bleiklie et al. 2000). The ambitions are impressive. After a 
period of steep growth during the 1990s, the first decade of the 21st Century shall be 
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dedicated to flesh out the comprehensive higher education system that was built up with 
a qualitatively improved content. In its report to Parliament on the proposal the 
government stated that the goal goes beyond the ambition of creating better higher 
education institutions. The ambition is to make Norway «a leading nation of 
knowledge». We shall argue that a break with tradition is possible and that current policies 
may cause changes that will be far more radical than previous reforms. However, we also 
argue that both the extent of change and the direction in which it will move depend on a 
number of conditions that are not yet settled. 
The reform that follows up the report of the Mjøs Commission (NOU 14: 2000) and 
the subsequent Parliamentary proposal (St.meld. nr. 27 (2000–2001)), was formally 
approved by Parliament on June 12. 2001. The reform got the upbeat name «The 
Quality Reform». It proposes apparent sweeping changes as to the way in which 
institutions are managed and organized; introduces a new degree structure that entails a 
change in the way in which study programs are organized aiming at shortening time to 
degree and raising completion rates; and intends to internationalize Norwegian higher 
education in a way that is basically different from previous attempts with the same 
stated purpose.  
The reform thus consists of three main components: 1) the study program reform which 
involves the implementation of the recommendations of the Bologna declaration with 
the introduction of a new degree structure: the so-called «3+2+3» or «3, 5, 8» system 
indicating the duration of the bachelor-, masters- and doctoral degree programs. The 
reform emphasizes the responsibility of the institutions for efficiency and successfulness 
of the study programs and the need to introduce modern teaching methods, frequent 
feedback to students, longer teaching semesters and portfolio evaluation instead of 
traditional lectures and written exams with rather long intervals that dominated 
particularly in the humanities and social sciences. The main goal is to make the degree 
studies more efficient by shortening the time of the degree programs and increasing 
compliance with program schedules and completion of study programs. The reforms 
aim at making students float more quickly and with more ease through the system. 
Important tools in this effort are supposed to be introduced, such as contracts between 
student and institution, organizing coherent study programs, better use of the entire, 
enlarged academic year, more varied and better adapted teaching methods and more 
contact with and frequent feedback to students. 2) Internationalization aims particularly at 
increasing mobility of bachelor degree students and to offer a 3 – 6 months’ stay abroad 
for all students who wish to travel. 3) Organizational changes concerning the formal status 
of higher education institutions in relation to central government, leadership structures 
at all levels within institutions and introduction of an incentive based element in the 
funding system that puts a heavy emphasis on the efficient production of exams and 
student credits.  
Among these three reform proposals the radical element seems to lie in the degree- 
or «study» reform which, if it is implemented as promised, will change the curricular, 
teaching and degree structure as well as student- and teacher roles in fundamental ways. 
Our preliminary interviews conducted at one university indicate that most teachers and 
students consider the study program reform to be the essence of the Quality reform. 
The changes are likely to affect the «free» faculties in particular. The explanation of this 
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break with the tradition as careful reformer may be that this tradition has been overrun 
by another Norwegian tradition: that of clever implementer of supranational agreements 
and decisions. In the effort of introducing a new European degree system, which is the 
intention of the Bologna declaration of 1999, Norway has been a front-runner if we 
consider the pace of the reform effort.  
One important reform tool is the new funding model that will be described below. It 
aims at introducing a clearer separation of education and research and emphasizes the 
role of incentives in promoting quality and efficiency in education and research.  
In the recommendation from the parliamentary Committee on ecclesiastic affairs, 
education and research that prepared the proposal that was submitted to Parliament, the 
ambitions were reiterated verbally. The committee unequivocally stated that the reform 
required extra funding, and the committee majority based its estimates on those made 
previously by the Council of Norwegian universities and colleges (i.e. the national 
organization of universities and colleges). The estimates said that a budget increase of 
1.5 billion NOK (about € 190 million) was needed in a transition period and 1.2 billion 
NOK on a regular basis after the introduction of the reform. The committee majority 
also clearly stated that if the reform was implemented without these extra resources, the 
reform would jeopardize, rather than increase the quality of higher education. These 
considerations indicate that the effects of the reform so far seem to depend on the extent 
to which sufficient resources are provided for the new teaching programs. In its 2004 
national budget proposal the government increased the higher education grants to a level 
that, although somewhat less than the institutions had asked for, was considered sufficient 
by the universities to carry out the reform. By December 2003, this proposal seems likely 
to be approved by Parliament. 
The changes that have been proposed with regard to institutional organization and 
leadership have until recently been offered far less attention. The committee proposed new 
legislation that suggested alternative principles for organizing the institutions under the 
Ministry. A majority proposed that they be organized as public enterprises whereas the 
minority recommended that they keep their status as «special civil service institutions». 
Regarding the internal organization a majority wanted appointed leaders and «unified» 
leadership, whilst a minority wanted to keep the existing arrangement with elected leaders 
and «dual» leadership, i.e. one elected academic leader and one head of administration.  
The Ministry subsequently gave institutions the freedom to choose whether they 
wanted to retain the «dual» leadership model or introduce a «unitary» leadership model. 
This might of course be interpreted as an expression of a radical form of liberalism. 
However, a special commission (the Ryssdal Commission) was named in order to study the 
matter and produce a joint recommendation on the issue. In connection with the 
committee work, a public controversy has surfaced in the summer of 2003. It was triggered 
by a declaration against a legislation that might organize universities as public enterprises 
that was circulated on the Internet. The controversy raised the issue of potential 
consequences of the organizational reform and it was been contended that it might 
jeopardize university autonomy and the freedom of research.  
The report was released in September 2003, but the committee was unable to agree on a 
common recommendation. However, although the majority and minority 
recommendations are similar to the previous proposals they were modified somewhat. The 
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most significant modification is that in this case the majority proposed that the institutions 
be organized as independent foundations rather than as public enterprises. The group of 
professors that initiated the public controversy is now arguing against the new majority 
proposal. They have also organized a campaign against the proposal and collected more 
than 4000 signatures from a majority of Norwegian professors and other academic 
employees. By late October 2003 the group established «Vox Academica», a forum for 
information and debate in order to shed light on the implications of the new law if the 
majority proposal is adopted. 
The introduction of the Quality Reform started the fall term of 2002, and the study 
program reform as well as the internationalization of study programs is scheduled to be 
fully introduced by the beginning of the fall term 2003. The institutions have 
complained that the funding they receive fails to meet the requirements of the study 
program reform and predicted that funding problems will increase in 2004 unless 
additional grants are provided. However, the budget proposal for 2004 went further 
than skeptics predicted in meeting the demands for extra funding.  
The organization and leadership reform is still not finally determined, however, it is 
safe to say that the majority proposals contains centralizing as well as decentralizing 
elements. They propose to strengthen the hand of central government through a more 
integrated and standardized higher education system and more extensive use of 
economic incentives in order to boost efficiency of the study programs, emphasizing 
student numbers, credits production and time to degree. However, they also propose to 
strengthen institutional autonomy by transferring decisions on a number of matters to 
the institutions. Yet within institutions, the traditional academic freedom, the autonomy 
of the individual scholar is sought reduced through stronger external influence on the 
university boards and stronger institutional leadership to convey that influence 
throughout the organization. Furthermore, they also look to strengthen the power of 
students as consumers, emphasizing the importance of student numbers for funding. 
What drives the process of public 
sector reform? 
Our approach focuses on the drivers behind the policy process. These drivers do not by 
themselves predict towards what kind of regime the process is heading, but point to 
mechanisms through which change occurs. Knowledge of these mechanisms may then 
form the basis for more precise assumptions about the direction of the reform process. 
The idea is that actors involved in processes of policy change may be motivated by 
various factors. Below we have distinguished between three different ideal patterns 
according to whether the process is driven by: 1) reform plans, 2) rule following based 
on habits or bureaucratic structures, or 3) political games by which actors engage in self-
serving strategic maneuvering based on their perceived interests. The perspectives bear a 
strong resemblance to Graham Allisons’ three decision making models in his famous 
book about the Cuban missile crisis (Allison 1971). However there are two important 
differences between the perspectives used here and Allison’s models. First, considering 
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the development of organization theory and theories of public policy over the three last 
decades our perspectives cover a wider set of theories and models that share some basic 
assumptions about organizational decision making. Second, the purpose as already 
indicated, is different in the sense that we are interested in understanding the interaction 
between the drivers or factors highlighted by the models rather than demonstrating the 
different stories rendered by the different conceptual lenses of three models. 
Rat ional  p lanning 
The outcome of the process may in principle be the result of a rational plan. Such a plan 
entails a combination of goals, norms and incentives that are communicated to, 
understood and accepted by the actors involved in such a way that it is implemented in 
accordance with the intentions of policy makers. The assumption on which this ideal 
rests is that the actors involved somehow are working together within a hierarchical 
order trying to fulfill general policy goals. New goals may require actors to develop 
organizational structures and ways of interaction that deviate from what they are 
accustomed to. Policy goals may express, in a sufficiently unequivocal way, values and 
aspirations that are shared by the actors. Even if the actors involved do not share policy 
goals, policies may come with incentives that motivate actors to behaving rationally in 
terms of policy goals. Theories based on this kind of perspective focus on the future, on 
internal organizational characteristics and action (Brunsson 2003). They assume that the 
driving force in reform processes are attempts at pursuing specified goals by using a set 
of consciously designed means. Processes of reform and change are thus oriented 
towards future goals and basically driven by the internal processes of choice identifying 
goals, followed by consciously chosen action strategies in order to achieve them. 
Organization literature has pointed to three main limitations on organizational 
rationality – cognition, complexity and dependency on the environment – that make it 
difficult for organizations to fulfill ideals of rational planning. Cognitive limitations 
imply that the organizations have limited information and attention spans, think locally 
and tend to opt for satisficing rather than perfect solutions (Simon and March 1958). 
Organizations are complex and with complexity the chances increase that conflicts of 
interest may arise between subdivisions within the organization. Therefore, goals tend to 
be quite general and vague because they need to accommodate the interests of actors 
with diverse and partly conflicting interests (Cyert and March 1963). Furthermore 
complex reform processes are often «loosely coupled» (Weick 1976), or coupled in ways 
that are not defined by the means-ends logic assumed by theories of rational action 
(Brunsson 2003). For instance, actors and policies are not necessarily just focused on the 
issues that they ostensibly deal with as part of the reform process, but also on processes 
and issues in other arenas. Although a government may invest much energy in gaining 
support for a certain policy, it does not necessarily intend to act on it and people who 
support it as a general program are not necessarily ready to accept the consequences of 
the same policy if it is implemented. Finally, organizations are dependent on their 
environment for resources and legitimacy (Cyert and March 1963). This means that a 
policy reform process does not only turn on the degree to which some clearly designed 
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policy is implemented, but on negotiations and accommodation with actors who are 
part of the process as well with actors and circumstances that constitute the 
environment of the policy process. Consequently their behavior may be affected by 
outside events that in turn affect the outcome of the process (March and Olsen 1976). 
For these reasons reform plans, like the Norwegian hospital and higher education 
reforms, tend not to be very specific, but require that the actors involved sort out a 
number of issues. Some of the issues have to do with how actors (institutional leaders) 
may develop their organizations, introduce new measures and implement policies locally 
that are consistent with and supportive of national policy goals. Another batch of issues 
has to do with how interests are affected by reforms and the extent to which the 
interests of actors that might otherwise thwart reforms are accommodated in the reform 
process. A third batch of issues has to do with how the policy process is affected by the 
environment. The fact that the public sectors involved depend on externally generated 
resources means that they need to enjoy a measure of legitimacy among politicians and 
the public at large. Finally, complex processes consist of multiple arenas. Actors on the 
parliamentary arena may have their policy positions on hospital care and higher 
education shaped by the coalition politics and logrolling as well as by party programs 
and personal convictions.  
Rule  fo l lowing 
In organization theory it is commonplace to assume that rational action is limited by the 
fact that actors are circumscribed by rules and norms e.g. as Standardized Operating 
Procedures (SOPs) (Allison 1971:67ff). This does not only apply to individual 
organization members, but also to organizations themselves as parts of a wider social 
context. New institutionalists have consequently taken the argument further when they 
emphasize that actors are not only constrained in their choices by their normative 
environment, their preferences are also shaped by it and they become themselves 
carriers of normative expectations (March and Olsen 1989, Peters 1999). In bureaucratic 
processes actors are in a number of ways guided by norms that make them accept and 
adopt certain routines and preferred modes of action in the face of reform policies. In 
order to understand their behavior as bureaucratic rule following we need to understand how 
actors let their behavior be guided by and justified in terms of organizational routines 
and SOPs. From a policy and management perspective, the classical problem associated 
with reform policies is that routines that are established with a goal oriented intent tend 
to live a life of their own and become imbued by meaning that gives them an 
independent value. Policies may thus be considered implemented once new procedures 
and routines that are assumed to the support the policy aim in question are in place. 
This observation has a number of implications: First of all in order to be implemented 
policies must be accepted as legitimate by the major actors and stakeholders involved. 
Secondly, legitimacy does not depend exclusively on the attractiveness of the policy 
content, but often as much on the procedures by which it is promoted. Similarly 
legitimacy is not just a question of how resources are distributed, but also on the 
symbols and values in terms of which it is justified (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Thirdly, 
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policy change tend to be slow and piecemeal as new proposals need to be accepted and 
understood in terms of existing values and symbols.  
That routines have a life of their own often becomes evident when existing 
organizational arrangements and procedures are challenged by reform policies. 
Performance measurement and detailed governmental regulation may furthermore 
divert reform efforts that aim at creating new organizational practices (e.g. increase 
institutional autonomy or enhance accountability) from such efforts and revert to 
routinized behavior that may be efficient, but not necessarily instrumental in achieving 
original goals. For example, although the intention of the Hospital reform is to make the 
new regional and local health corporations more autonomous from government 
regulation, the new system will easily become marred in detailed government regulation 
and rigid bureaucratic control within corporations. This tendency may be amplified by 
interprofessional power struggles and turf wars and subsequent attempts at keeping 
such conflicts under control. Thus the actors who are supposed to implement the 
reform become hostages of the organization with its bureaucratic characteristics in 
which they find themselves.  
Pol i t ica l  games 
The two above perspectives (rational planning and bureaucratic rule following) assume 
that organizational actors engage in collective activities and that their behavior is 
affected by collective mechanisms such as plans, rules or bargaining processes. 
However, there is also the possibility that actors may engage in political games in order to 
reach individual goals that they believe serve their interests (Allison 1971: 147ff). Their 
actions must be understood as means by which they try to acquire more resources, 
power or prestige. In order to understand how actors behave in a given policy domain, 
it is not sufficient to know policy contents in terms of policy aims and means. In 
addition one needs to know how actors perceive that their interests are affected by a 
policy and what strategies they apply in order to promote their interests under the 
conditions set by that policy. From a policy and management perspective, any reform 
initiative is problematic because of the difficulties associated with predicting how the 
players perceive new policies and how they react to the policy instruments that are 
deployed. 
Modernizing reforms such as the current reorganizations of the Norwegian hospital 
and higher education sectors may thus constitute just another arena where established 
interest groups (professionals, administrators, government bureaucrats, politicians and 
media) engage in their usual games. In a situation where actors behave cynically in terms 
of policy goals and where all or at least some actors will be dissatisfied with policy 
outcomes, strategies are likely to involve attempts at media exploitation, window 
dressing, and blame games. In such a case one might say that the reform and the 
organization through which it is sought implemented become hostages to the individual 
interests and self-serving behavior of the actors.  
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Two reform processes compared –  some 
assumpt ions 
The three perspectives outlined above point to a number of processes that may be 
crucial in shaping the reform process and determine its future such as accommodating 
the interests of major actors through bargaining processes, adaptation to the 
environment, the ability to legitimize the reforms in terms of existing values and 
accepted ways of doing things, and the ability to discourage actors from engaging in 
political games designed to serve individual goals at the expense of those of the 
organization. 
The perspectives are not alternative, but complementary and they highlight different 
kinds of drivers that may be at work during the reform processes. Norwegian hospitals 
and universities share certain characteristics that may invite us to assume that reform 
policies aiming at regime change may face similar challenges, but there are also clear 
differences between them that make them interesting cases for comparison. Firstly, the 
core activities in both sectors are carried out by strong knowledge based professional 
groups that are likely to interpret and value reform proposals in terms of their group 
interests and values. However, work is organized differently in hospitals and universities 
and professional associations and unions are organized differently. Professionals in 
hospitals (physicians, nurses etc.) belong to hierarchically and functionally different 
groups, and they belong to different professional associations and partly different 
unions (Berg 1987). University academics on the other hand are horizontally divided in 
various disciplines, but they fulfill the same functions, teaching and research. Most of 
them are organized in the same union, and to some extent they are perceived as one 
profession (Clark 1987, Høstaker 2000). 
Secondly, in both sectors there is a tension between two forms of authority – one 
based in the bureaucratic–administrative hierarchical line of formal authority and the 
second on professional meritocracy and occupational hierarchies. Yet the main tensions 
that structure conflicts in the two types of organizations are usually different. In 
hospitals conflicts between the major professional groups, physicians and nurses, tend 
to overshadow and shape the tension between administrators and professionals (Berg 
1987). In universities on the other hand administrators and academics tend to perceive 
their institutions as sites where the two groups are engaged in a tug-of-war that 
constitutes the major conflict dimension within these institutions (Bleiklie et al. 2000).  
Thirdly, in both sectors potentially radical reforms are introduced in settings where 
strong traditions exist that inform actors’ beliefs about how the work should be done 
and how it ought to be organized. Yet the traditions are based on different social values: 
In hospitals they center on ideas about medical and other forms of professional authority 
that shape the internal division of labor. In universities traditions turn on the value of 
autonomy of academic institutions and individual academics.  
Our main argument is that reform processes in the two sectors are likely to be 
facilitated or hampered by different factors because the social relationships are 
structured in different ways in terms of organizational arrangements, conflict patterns 
and value systems. 
WORKING PAPER  22  –  2003 TAKING POWER FROM KNOWLEDGE 
 20  
Based on previous experience we would accordingly expect that the pattern of 
behavior that is most likely to structure the reform process in the hospital sector is 
fragmented interest struggle. This means that various professional groups are inclined to 
evaluate the reform proposal in terms of group interests, and they are as likely to feel 
threatened by other professional groups as by political and administrative leadership. 
Professionals are likely to focus more on working conditions and wages than on hospital 
ownership and governing structures per se. Expressions of opposition and discontent 
have traditionally taken the form of interest struggle and pressure politics with active use 
of mass media in order to mobilize political support. However, the reform goal is 
precisely to cope with internal fragmentation, create more transparent organizations 
with clearer responsibilities and make the new health enterprises into more coherent 
institutions that are better equipped to operate as actors. Negotiation and conflict 
resolution are crucial activities in the reform process in order to accommodate the 
fragmented interests involved and established legitimate corporate leadership. An 
indication of successful transition to a new regime may be that hospital leadership 
enjoys more public visibility and professionals less in matters related to hospital 
administration and funding. But the indication is an ambiguous one and there is always 
the possibility of less visible resistance in terms of bureaucratic rule following. 
As for higher education experience suggest that the reform process is likely to be 
affected by symbolic value defense. University academics are inclined to evaluate reform 
proposals in terms of real or perceived threats against the value of (personal or 
institutional) autonomy. Such threats are usually vague, and academics are as likely 
(maybe more likely) to focus on formal leadership and governing structures as symbols 
of power that may protect or undermine autonomy, than on how they may affect 
specific working conditions or wages. Typical expressions of opposition are the staging 
of public controversies in national media3, or undermining reforms by ignoring them or 
translating them into forms that are considered appropriate. Reforms are usually 
implemented in a decentralized manner were committees of faculty at the operative 
department level are given considerable leeway to give substance to reforms during the 
implementation process. A smooth regime transition would be one in which academics 
trade power for autonomy, accepting the notion that it is difficult to have both. 
Shaping hospital reform 
In this part we will discuss further how recent reforms in the Norwegian health care 
sector might play out in light of the three perspectives. In addition to the Hospital 
reform we shall also consider the impact of the Patients bill of rights in order to get a 
fuller picture of ongoing hospital reform efforts.  
                                                 
3 Previous reforms in higher education have all been partly defined by accompanying public controversies: about 
positivism in 1969, academic excellence in 1988 and Management by objectives in 1989. 
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The Hospita l  reform as rat ional  p lanning 
This perspective assumes that process of health care reform may be driven by planning 
brought about by a response to specific problems in the health care sector. According to 
this interpretation politicians aided by experts have formulated policy goals and selected 
means that shall bring the Norwegian health sector from a bureaucratic system 
characterized by efficiency-problems to a more cost-efficient, consumer-friendly and 
competitive system. This is a perspective that represents the ideal that may be inferred 
from the aims of the Hospital Reform and the Patient rights act. We shall therefore 
point to three different contradictions in the reform that follow from the way it is 
designed and indicate explanations for the design depending on the balance that will be 
struck between: a) efficiency and patients’ expressed needs, b) the focus on planning 
within the hospital sector and the need to coordinate between specialized and primary 
care, c) the creation of monopolies and the goal of competition. 
First, considering how the reforms have been formulated they may be interpreted as 
attempts at achieving efficiency and consumer-orientation through devolution of 
authority to regional health enterprises, stronger institutional leadership and at the same 
time increased emphasis on patient rights including patients´ rights to choose provider. 
The reforms thus appear to introduce two different management principles at the same 
time – both increased planning by introducing regional enterprises that threaten to 
become de facto monopolies and increased competition by the extended patient choice. 
The outcome of the reforms may depend on the extent to which the sector succeeds 
in balancing the two reforms and on the ability of the government to avoid involvement 
in the affairs of the health regions in a way that is not detrimental to reform goals and 
the legitimacy of the regional health enterprises. Too much emphasis on the planning 
model implied by the health regions may divert the focus from patient interests and 
rights. However, if patients’ right to choose provider are emphasized too strongly, this 
may represent a threat against the efficiency as well as the medical quality of health care. 
If patients emphasize closeness to hospitals and their preferences affect the hospital 
structure in a region, the sector is likely to consist of relatively many small hospitals. As 
a consequence the catchment area for patients becomes too small to provide physicians 
with a sufficient number of patients to provide adequate training in advanced treatment 
procedures and a lack of advanced medical equipment. This again may result in reduced 
efficiency, less economy of scale advantages and poorer quality of services. 
Secondly, let us now assume that in spite of the obstacles pointed at above, the 
Hospital reform will succeed in creating a modern, decentralized and efficient 
organization. This means that the hopes of the Ministry of Health, of more clearly 
defined responsibilities, which are quoted below from an official document, will be 
fulfilled: 
«One of the most important initiatives of the reform is that the hospitals will have 
more clearly defined roles and responsibilities. This is due to the fact that the 
entities will, as mentioned above, no longer be an integral part of the public 
administration. Rather they will be organized as enterprises. These enterprises will 
have their own responsibilities as employers and will be responsible for use of 
capital. The enterprises will also be responsible for their own finances, with the 
restriction that they may not go into voluntary liquidation. As sole owner, the 
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central government will have unlimited responsibility for and full control of the 
enterprises.» 4 
However, the reform appears to focus exclusively on regional and local health 
enterprises as means to achieve its goals. One implication of successful development of 
a rational organization in the above sense is increased efficiency by increased 
specialization and coordination within the organization. Hospitals may therefore emerge 
as production units that get patients through the hospital system with a minimum of 
time. Provided that the hospitals become efficient, this easily runs into conflict with the 
idea that health enterprises are supposed to create public goods at an acceptable quality 
from a patient point of view. This has implied in recent years an increasing emphasis on 
the needs of the individual patient.  
One of the main challenges posed by recent developments in the health care sector – 
such as shorter lengths of hospital stays, more emergency care and an increasing 
proportion of patients with chronic diseases – is to create a treatment program that is 
holistic from the patients’ point of view. A crucial question, accordingly, is how hospital 
care is coordinated with primary health care. The Hospital reform does not seem to deal 
with such overall coordination problems that nevertheless will surface and affect its 
chances of success. Although the central government determines much of the legal and 
financial operating conditions for health services outside hospitals, they are nonetheless 
run by municipalities. The state has a limited authority to decide how municipalities shall 
allocate their resources. Therefore, there is always a risk that patients may finish their 
medical treatment at a hospital and then be denied access to the primary health care 
services they need (e.g. nursing home). Coordination problems of this nature may 
therefore lead to well-known efficiency problems where hospitals are forced to retain 
patients who normally would be sent to a nursing home, or where emphasis on efficient 
treatment without polyclinical follow up services creates a huge population of «revolving 
door patients» who occupy a substantial part of hospital capacity. 
Third, if the reforms are interpreted as a response to an ambition to pursue not just 
the goal of efficiency, but also that of competition, it is difficult to understand why 
effective monopolies were created with the introduction of five health regions. One is 
easily left with the impression that planning and control have been emphasized rather 
than the competitive context for local health enterprises that was emphasized in policy 
documents.  
Considered as rational planning there are features of the reform that are difficult to 
understand. However if one takes into account that the reform needs to win the support 
or at least compliance in a complex environment in which many different actors and 
interests are involved, they are easier to understand as attempts at easing negotiations 
with significant actors and adaptation to conflicting demands e.g. from professional 
groups, administrators and politicians. Thus the observation that not being too rational 
in a narrow sense are in fact quite smart may turn out to be corroborated by this case as 
                                                 
4 The Norwegian hospital reform – Central government assumptions responsibility for hospitals. 
http://odin.dep.no/shd/sykehusreformen/aktuelt/rapport/030071-990126, 19.02.03 
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well. Viewed as a planning process, the reform does not seem likely to lead to a change 
towards market and patient driven hospital care, but looks rather like a rearrangement of 
responsibilities within a public regime. 
Bureaucrat ic  structures  and 
interprofess ional  conf l ic ts  
In this perspective the changes that take place must be seen in the context of an 
international process of change where justification for the Norwegian reforms bears a 
strong resemblance to the way in which similar reforms are justified in other countries. 
The reforms in most countries have as their purpose to gain control in economic and 
efficiency terms over the modern public hospital under the assumption that this will 
reduce it’s most perennial and difficult political problem: the waiting lists. Although the 
Norwegian health care sector is supposed to be modern and well funded it has faced 
efficiency problems during the last years compared to other western countries. The 
Hospital reform may therefore be considered a general answer to efficiency- and 
effectiveness problems in the sector.  
There is little doubt among policy makers that Norway faces a financial problem in 
the sector. Health budgets have grown very rapidly, particularly in the period 1997–
1999, and they have grown twice as fast as in the rest of the public sector. Norway 
currently ranks as one of the biggest spenders on health care, measured as a ratio of the 
gross domestic product (GDP), among OECD countries. Although there has been 
considerable growth in patient treatment, the size of waiting lists has remained stable 
and even growing. The period 1990–1999 has seen the number of physicians rise by 
50% in terms of man-years, while nursing man-years have risen by 45% in the 
institutional health service.5 
The Hospital reform aims in this perspective at creating a modern organization that 
operates flawlessly in a rational sense. Therefore, the emphasis is likely to be put on a 
clear delineation of responsibility and power in order to control behavior. In this 
perspective rules may affect the changes that the Hospital reform aims at achieving in 
two different ways.  
First, the organization theory behind the reform implies that policies are 
implemented from top down and top-level decisions often tend to be communicated 
downwards as rules and regulations. One of the problems built into the Hospital reform 
is that rules may be produced at different levels: by the Ministry, the regional health 
enterprises and the local health enterprises. The higher up the locus of rule production, 
the more difficult it is for the regional and local health enterprises to behave rationally in 
the above sense. Within months after the reform was implemented, health enterprise 
                                                 
5 Hellandsvik P. Lecture given at the meeting for Deans and Teaching Hospitals in Reykjavik 31 August 2001. 
Available on internet: http://odin.dep.no/odinarktiv/norsk/dep/shd/2001/eng. 
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CEOs complained about the number and detailed nature of rules and regulations by 
which they are supposed to abide, which are produced by the Ministry of Health.  
Secondly, although health enterprise managers are provided with the authority to 
manage their enterprises autonomously, major interest groups within the enterprise may 
resist managerial initiatives by emphasizing (formally or informally) existing rules and 
procedures in their daily activities. In the latter case new policies may be reduced to new 
justifications for existing practices. Regardless of the level at which rules are brought to 
bear on the Hospital reform, the danger that threatens the reform is that it becomes 
hostage of existing practices and the established structures on which such practices are 
based. 
The bureaucratic processes seem to contribute to a rearranging of responsibilities 
within a health care system dominated by the tension between levels of government and 
between bureaucratic structures and professionals. It is in this context difficult to 
discern any move towards market driven competition and patient influence. 
Responsib i l i ty  and «the b lame game» 
It has been pointed out that «the health gap» – the ever-increasing discrepancy between 
treatment opportunities made possible by developments in medical technology and 
research, and the funding at hand to make these opportunities available to the 
population – in many ways constitute the basic policy problem in health care (Saltman et 
al 1998, Lian 2003:36). The «health gap» is however not recognized officially as a policy 
problem. It is typically portrayed as a «question of priorities». The public debate 
concerning waiting lists demonstrates how the health gap is transformed into an 
efficiency and priority problem. A possible interpretation of the reform is therefore that 
it tries to transfer the problem to the individual hospitals and avoid the intractable 
policy problem caused by «the health gap». To the extent that this kind of motivation 
drives the process, politicians easily become engaged in a political «blame game» where 
the core question turns on who is to blame for «the health gap». 
The Hospital reform may thus be understood as a response to the nature of politics 
in the sector. If one considers the Hospital reform in the light of previous reforms, one 
may argue that the major problem has been the tendency of reform policies to become 
entangled in political games in a sector where many well-organized and resourceful 
actors permanently struggle for their interests. Reform policies therefore tend to be of 
secondary importance and subordinated the interest struggle. In order to better 
understand the nature of the political games, we shall briefly sum up the recent history 
of reforms in the specialist health service.  
Already in 1974 five health regions were introduced to reflect the fact that as far as 
specialist medicine was concerned, a large catchment area was needed in order to secure 
high-quality services at an acceptable cost (St.meld. nr 9 1974–1975). This was the first 
step in moving the planning function from the county councils to larger regional entities 
comprising several counties. The five new health regions did not constitute a new 
administrative level, but their establishment meant that the 19 county councils 
henceforth were obliged to cooperate within their respective regions. 
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The next step in transferring influence from the county council level was taken with 
the introduction of activity based-funding (also called flexible budget) in 1997. As a 
consequence the power of the county councils to make priorities in terms of budget 
decisions as well as keeping over all cost control was removed. This made cost control 
even more problematic. In order to handle the situation the county councils used 
waiting lists as buffers when costs became too high. The popular legitimacy of county 
councils as health care policy makers was therefore called into question. Consequently 
county councils often lost the «blame game», as they were held responsible for tight 
budget frames as well as cost overruns (total cost control), but had no authority to 
straighten out their own problems.  
The hospitals on their part tried to cope by pressuring the central government for 
more resources. Activity based funding made it legitimate for hospitals to demand 
increased funding in order to boost production and reduce waiting lists. The central 
government was almost unable to turn down requests for extra resources, because they 
did not know how to justify such a refusal. One reason was the fact that they did not 
know how to determine the causes of the hospitals´ needs; whether they were caused by 
inefficiency, increased patient load, or mistakes related to activity accounting (the use of 
DRG-points) or other reasons.6   
The problem faced by county councils was exacerbated by the fact that modern 
hospitals are strongly influenced from bottom up by highly qualified and powerful 
professions who tend to struggle for resources in order to expand and improve their 
services. Whether one interprets the struggle as an altruistic struggle on behalf of 
patients or as selfish interest group activity, the fact remains that influence exerted by 
professions tends to make hospitals difficult to manage (Berg 1987, Bleiklie 1997, 
Erichsen 1996, Østergren and Sahlin-Andersson 1998). In many cases professionals 
operated as independent policy makers who actively tried to influence the priorities of 
county politicians by attacking hospital managers in public or pressuring them to 
pleading with the central government for more funding. Hospital managers sometimes 
learned about the latest initiatives taken by hospital professionals in the media, and felt 
compelled to respond to such initiatives because of media exposure rather than as a 
consequence of well-considered plans. 
As indicated above, the legitimate authority of the county councils as well-qualified 
hospital owners had become seriously impaired. The rules of the game that used to 
form the basis for county council ownership and operational responsibility were no 
longer present. Both central government policies as well as the maneuvering of 
professions aided by mass media, had undermined the basis for county council 
responsibility, and by implementing the Hospital reform the process came to a logical 
end. After introducing reforms that rendered county councils ineffective as hospital 
owners, the central government took over and assumed the responsibility. However, 
                                                 
6 In the years 1997–2002, the government allocated extra funding to the hospitals four times. The arguments they 
used were  1) a difficult economic situation due to  physicians’ increased salaries, 2) increased production, 3) a 
difficult situation for the regional hospitals and 4) increased production and compensation for economic problems 
related to  the transformation to regional health enterprises (St.prp. nr 83 (1996–1997), St.prp. nr. 47 (1999–2000), 
Innst.S. nr. 241 (1999–2000), St.prp. nr 22 (2001–2002), St.prp. nr 59 (2001–2002), Innst.S. nr. 243 (2001–2002).  
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introducing state ownership in the hospital sector was not necessarily a logical response 
to the inefficiency problems in the hospital sector. It was rather a consequence of the 
fact that the county councils had lost their legitimacy as hospital owners and were thus 
no longer seen as a viable alternative.  
Will the Hospital reform make it possible to avoid «the blame game» in which 
powerful public pressures generated by strong interests and high expectations combine 
with unclear responsibilities to create an atmosphere where actors put much energy into 
avoiding responsibility and fingering scapegoats? Does the introduction of regional 
health enterprises and state ownership make it more likely that the energy that has been 
dedicated to «blame games» now will be redirected to problem solving instead? No 
doubt, a regime change has taken place. The power of professional communities and the 
dynamics of interprofessional struggle seem to have been replaced by hospital managers, 
and a professional–political regime has thus been replaced by a political–managerial one. 
Previous research demonstrates that changed ownership does not create an efficient 
and effective organization by itself (Sørensen and Dalen 2001, Kaarbøe and Kjerstad 
2001). The usual rationale for central government ownership is that it takes the needs of 
society into consideration in a sector where the market does not work or does not exist. 
The assumption is that publicly owned enterprises make it possible to produce public 
goods efficiently and effectively. Yet if true, the assumption implies that the same goal 
might have been achieved under the previous owner provided that the county councils 
enjoyed the authority and legitimacy that is required. A condition for generating change 
by state ownership is that the central authorities behave differently from the county 
councils. Otherwise the new health enterprises will end up in the same situation as the 
county councils. Therefore the expectation that comes with the reform is that the state 
has to be a more active owner than the county councils used to be. 
What this general prescription may entail in practice is highly ambiguous. If state 
ownership is emphasized, the implication is that the state needs to be an active owner 
who is prepared to impose its will on the health enterprises. If the introduction of the 
enterprise form of hospital organization is emphasized, then the state needs to give the 
health enterprises more freedom to manage their affairs as they see fit. Thus the specific 
reform may be regarded both as an attempt to become an active owner as well as an 
attempt at government abdication. The idea is to decentralize authority to hospitals in 
order to make it easier for them to adapt to their environment. However, 
decentralization is a complex process fraught with tensions. Firstly, decentralization of 
public services turns on responsibility as well as on power. Decentralizing the former 
has proven easier than decentralizing the latter. This may leave the regional health 
enterprises and the individual health enterprises under them, in a situation that is similar 
to the one experienced by county councils and hospital managers previously: Health 
enterprises and regional enterprises are left with responsibility but without sufficient 
legal and financial means to deal with the problems for which they are held responsible.  
If this turns out to be the case, the central government may soon find itself in the 
familiar situation of having to bail out health enterprises from problems they have been 
forced to try deal with, but are unable to solve. One case in point is the fact that 
regional health enterprises by law are prevented from going into voluntary liquidation. 
This may pave the way for a continuation of the «blame game», but this time with a new 
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set of actors, the regional health enterprises and the state, as main contenders. To what 
extent professional groups may still enter the game is an open question and depends at 
least to some extent on whether local health enterprises will be more effective than 
hospitals at disciplining their employees. Impressionistic evidence from the latter half of 
2003 suggests that this is what has happened: Regime change has taken place in the 
sense that new actors have become powerful in the hospital sector, whereas the 
previous power holders seem to fade away. However, politics within the sector seem to 
remain the same. Health enterprise CEOs now seem to be playing the game with the 
Health Ministry as adversary. Meanwhile the previous actors seem to have been 
sidelined. Whereas County Counties simply have been stripped of their previous 
responsibilities, the professions have become silenced or at least less visible in public 
policy controversies. If these preliminary observations turn out to be valid, then we have 
had a successful regime change, but one that has not affected the policy problem that 
regime change was supposed to solve. 
Higher education in the mold 
Compared to previous higher education reforms, the Quality reform has been the object 
of a relatively high degree of interest from political parties. Below we shall try to indicate 
some possible developments of the Quality Reform process. We shall furthermore 
present some interpretations of the reform, concerning what it is about and what are the 
central issues for those who are responsible for the implementation of the reform. 
The Qual i ty  reform as  a  p lanning device   
The Quality Reform may be conceived as rational planning brought about by a response 
to specific problems in higher education where politicians aided by experts have 
formulated policy goals and selected means that shall bring Norwegian higher education 
and basic research up from a mediocre level into the ranks of the leading nations of 
knowledge in the world. This is a perspective that has been expressed in statements by 
politicians and promoters of the reform. Considering how the quality reform has been 
formulated it may be interpreted as an attempt to achieve a higher degree of efficiency 
through devolution of authority to the institutions, stronger leadership, increased 
emphasis on internationalization and a funding model that is supposed to provide 
incentives for improvement. The content of the reform is in this perspective a direct 
product of the ambitions of politicians.  
The outcome of the reform depends on the resources that are put into the effort and 
how well adapted the ends are to the stated goals. The funding model is important in 
this connection. The model consists of three different components: Firstly, there is a 
basic grant of about 60% of today’s budgets. Furthermore about 25% is supposed to be 
a reward for teaching performance based on the production of credits, candidates and 
international student exchange. Finally about 15% is supposed to consist of incentives 
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related to research performance based on the proportion of academic staff that has 
associate professor level qualifications and the influx of external research funds.  
The model has been criticized for two reasons. Partly it has been accused of 
encouraging institutions to lower standards in order to produce ‘successful’ students. 
Partly it has been said to encourage teaching at the expense of research. The process has 
been characterized by disagreement about leadership and organization principles, and 
the discussion has to some extent followed the classic pattern of exchanges between 
‘traditionalists’ and ‘modernizers’. None of the specific proposals have won general 
acceptance, and whereas traditionalists argue that the institutions better protect 
university autonomy against the state and the market if they retain their status as civil 
service agencies, modernizers insist that the institutions will gain a level of autonomy 
they have not enjoyed previously if they are organized as public enterprises. This latter 
question moved into center stage of the public controversy that surfaced during the 
summer of 2003 and that led to the establishment of «Vox Academica». However, there 
are no indications that the opposition is planning any kind of resistance beyond 
exercising pressure on decision makers by keeping the controversy alive. 
Less open controversy has surfaced in the discussion over leadership models, but the 
underlying controversy is similar to the one quoted above. How far should the 
institutions go in imitating real or perceived characteristics of business enterprises? 
Regardless which solutions are chosen, power is to be taken from collegial bodies 
dominated by academic staff and transferred to leaders and executive boards. The 
choice between the models implies differences regarding the extent of the transfer of 
power and considerable ambiguity regarding in which direction power is moving and as 
to who may be likely power holders in the future. The public enterprise model is 
presented by its supporters as one that will strengthen institutions and enable them to 
act strategically and flexibly in the emerging market environment for higher education 
and research. Its opponents on the other hand, argue that it opens up universities to 
more direct interference from the Ministry as well as from market forces that are 
detrimental to the freedom of teaching and research. 
Impressionistic data from interviews at one Norwegian university indicate overall 
support of the reform aims and in particular the major changes suggested by the 
proposed study program reform. This bodes well for reform ambitions. Among faculty 
the perception that change is needed was a dominant one, and few expressed opinions 
indicating the likelihood of open resistance or subversive behavior, like the window-
dressing or foot dragging that have been observed in connection with previous reforms 
(Bleiklie et al. 2000). Their enthusiasm with the proposals was, however dampened by 
the disillusionment with inadequate funding, particularly among university and faculty 
leaders and some faculty. Their perception was that increased funding, which all actors 
seemed to agree on in the parliamentary stage of the reform process, had not been 
provided by the government in the implementation stage. Their response to this 
situation was that they wanted to comply as far as possible under whatever constraints 
they might face. However, with the budget proposal for 2004, these concerns seem to 
have been reduced. Surprising little defense of existing arrangements or subversive or 
cynical attitudes because of the perceived lack of resources were expressed. These 
attitudes bode well for the change that the Quality Reform seeks to achieve. 
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However, if the reform is interpreted as a planned response to a quality problem 
caused by mediocre teaching and research performance in an international perspective, 
it has been argued against the reform that it is difficult to see a clear link between the 
goals and the means that are applied. Both the funding model and the apparently limited 
resources that have been dedicated compared to what politicians and the higher 
education institutions apparently agreed on were necessary in the parliamentary phase, 
may threaten the reform understood as rational problem solving. Again it seems that at 
least the latter of these concerns has been taken seriously by the government. 
One reason for the insecurity surrounding the reform may be that it operates with an 
ambiguous quality concept. As has been pointed out by Charlton and Andras (2003) in 
the case of higher education reform in the UK, the quality concept that was introduced 
with modern quality management audit systems was directed towards enforcing 
minimum standards and predictable outcomes. It distinguished in a binary fashion 
between outcomes that fail to meet the standards and those that ‘pass’ in order to 
deliver a consistent product. Much of the rhetoric in higher education policy and in 
academic institutions in the UK presumed that quality was about continuous 
improvement of academic standards and that outcomes could be arranged hierarchically 
from ‘excellent’ to ‘poor’. In a rapidly expanding higher education system that was 
progressively less selective and over time reduced unit costs, quality management 
systems were important to prevent that the planned reduction in standards fall below a 
minimum level. Since much of the implementation and detailing of the quality systems 
were left to higher education institutions and academics, these double and partly directly 
opposite standards were built into the system and produced a particular mix of 
dishonesty and confusion that led to the failure of the Quality Assurance Agency. The 
analysis of the Norwegian Quality Reform should be open to the possibility that similar 
ambiguity is built into the reform and look for possible implications thereof. 
Other aspects of the reform process might on the other hand, facilitate rational 
planning and predictable reform outcomes. The impression of wide shared support of 
the reform objectives indicate that conditions are favorable for developing viable 
settlements that combine fundamental change and are accepted by major interest groups 
during the reform process. Judging from historical experience, outside events such as 
economic downturns, may support reform. Interestingly the study program reform is a 
product of the Bologna-process which caught up with and affected the domestic work 
of the Mjøs Commission. Rising unemployment may increase funding for higher 
education and «solve» current funding problems, if the tradition of using the higher 
education system as an instrument for labor market regulation persists.  
Rule  fo l lowing in  Academia  
A second possibility is to consider the Quality reform as part of a bureaucratic process in 
which changes come about gradually, almost imperceptibly in long term processes of 
institutional change – revolution in slow motion (Olsen 1983) – in which 
comprehensive reform proposals in the 1970s, 1990s and the Quality reform gradually 
are introduced, adapted and polished and take their place as symbolic monuments in 
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what amounts to a gradual process of change. In this perspective the changes that take 
place must be seen in the context of an international process of change where the 
justification for the Norwegian reforms bears a strong resemblance to the way in which 
similar reforms are justified in other countries. The reforms in most countries form part 
of a long-term strategy with to main purposes. One purpose is to gain control in 
economic and efficiency terms over the modern mass systems of higher education that 
have emerged. The second purpose is to organize and manage institutions in ways that 
fit current ideas about how large organizations ought to be managed and organized 
(Meyer and Rowan 1977). In this perspective the ability of institutional leaders to 
develop long-term strategies is important. In order to have a realistic appraisal of their 
own limitations and possibilities as leaders they ought to understand how ambitious 
reforms like the Quality reform find their place in history as small steps in the long term 
process of institutional change. 
One way in which reform processes may fall prey to bureaucratic or institutional 
inertia is the tendency to use existing procedures and established rules of thumb as a 
measuring rod in order to determine how much change a reform implies. The reform 
will accordingly tend to be adapted to existing practices. An important institutional 
characteristic in this connection is the way in which the prevailing understanding of 
university autonomy and academic autonomy has interfered with university reforms. 
Usually reforms have been introduced with some sort of reciprocal understanding that 
they should be implemented in ways that are acceptable to the academic staff. As long 
as the basic purpose of the reform is served, one may implement the reform in a way 
that suits local or even individual preferences and practices. Reform policies therefore 
have been consensus oriented and tended to imply little change. 
Although there seems to be a general support of the intentions of the Quality 
reform, several actors we interviewed voiced concerns indicating that there may be 
many reasons why one should stick to old practices rather than adopt new ones 
mandated by the reform. First, based on the resources argument some held that reform 
by itself was just a formal structure and that changed practices within the new structures 
at least in part depended on fresh resources. Secondly in connection with the 
introduction of new leadership forms some actors held that academics in their own 
department preferred the traditional collegial model, which they would continue to 
practice regardless of the formal arrangements that might be implemented 
Higher  educat ion and the ef f ic iency game  
A final possibility is that the Quality reform becomes driven by a political game that in this 
case is likely to resemble an institutionalized ritual. If one considers the reform in the 
context of previous major university reforms, the reforms of the late 1960s and early 
1970s (based on the proposals of the Ottosen commission) and those of the late 1980s 
and early 1990s (based on the proposals of the Hernes commission), one may argue that 
they have all tried to come to grips with an efficiency problem.  
This problem, which expresses itself in terms of high drop out rates and low credit 
production, is primarily located in the free faculties at the universities. The eternal 
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problem of the free faculties in Norway is that they have been open to anyone who 
generally qualifies as a student and has a high school diploma. These faculties have no 
control of the number of students they are supposed to serve and are therefore unable 
to regulate the balance between demand for and available resources. They are therefore 
victims of circumstances they cannot control. Quality concepts, teaching programs and 
credit production are products of these circumstances, and the conditions for conscious 
quality improvement are far from ideal. Authorities are on the one hand under a certain 
pressure to do something about these problems, yet they are unable or unwilling to do 
something about the fundamental problem. To deal with the fundamental problem they 
would either have to dedicate the funding that is necessary or to grant institutions the 
freedom to regulate the demand for resources by regulating student admission.  
From time to time the authorities take action in order to address the problem by 
means of efficiency rituals that do not deal with the operating conditions at the core of 
the problem. There is therefore little reason to wonder why there are no well-developed 
connections between what politicians say they want to accomplish and the means they 
are willing to dedicate to the purpose. When the Quality reform has been implemented 
and taken its course we may all lean back and wait for the next major reform. This is a 
rather more skeptical and pessimistic perspective. It directs our attention to established 
norms and habitual ways of action that are hard to change and not always easily 
recognizable. In this perspective leaders may easily become victims of circumstances, 
squeezed between the expectations of politicians and the public at large of strong and 
competent leadership and the actual working conditions that provide very limited 
possibilities to exercise leadership. The admission question is likely to be profoundly 
affected by the introduction of a course credit system, because it moves the admission 
question from faculties and departments to study programs. However, the implications 
are still not clear and university administrators are not ready to answer unequivocally the 
question of whether open admission still exists or not. 
Let us now return to the funding model and point at some of the consequences that 
may follow if it is implemented as proposed by the government. We will discuss these 
consequences in the light of the clear reform goal that students are supposed to be 
successful. Whereas some courses and study programs are easily filled with students 
who compete for admission, others are not in a position to impose entrance 
requirements. Among the latter type of programs which are likely to be located in the 
traditional free faculties, there is also a relatively high likelihood that academic staff will 
have few means by which they can demand anything from the students in terms of 
paper writing or participation in classes. The implication of the Quality Reform is that in 
order to reach its goals demands for improvement are exclusively put on the institution 
and the academic staff. However, given the operating conditions we have described, one 
of the few options the free faculties will have to improve their budgets is to adapt 
standards and quality requirements to student performance. If the reform is interpreted 
as rational problem solving it is difficult to see how the politicians’ ambitions about 
higher quality are supported by incentives that under the given circumstances invite 
academics to lower the quality requirements directed at student performance. Yet if one 
interprets the reform as a ritual that is less binding in terms of political action, this 
behavior may be explained as the outcome of a complex political game where actions 
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are not necessarily motivated by goals of the reform, but by immediate concerns of 
improving support for government policies in parliament or in the electorate. 
These pitfalls notwithstanding, the study program reform will to varying extent 
directly affect the basic process of teaching and quite possibly indirectly affect the 
conditions for research. According to our preliminary data the reform is thus quite likely 
to have an impact, quite possibly result in higher efficiency and, given the 2004 level of 
funding, and better quality. However, it is still an open question what will happen to the 
proposed regime change, both regarding the formal status of the institutions and the 
leadership and management models that will be chosen. On the one hand professional 
influence has been weakened if one looks at representation on institutional boards. On 
the other hand, other reforms are still not determined. We have therefore seen a 
movement from a political professional regime towards a stronger administration and a 
move towards stronger influence by the state and administrative bodies and a political–
administrative regime. To what extent the regime has been changed is, however still an 
open question. We might therefore in this case quite possible see a reform where the 
new regime that was supposed to generate changed policy content is not established, 
whereas the policy changes nonetheless will be implemented. 
Conclusion – Regime Change as a 
Condition for Policy Change 
We have analyzed the two reforms as political moves aiming at regime change. It seems 
quite clear which parties – the professional communities – are losing power, but it is not 
equally clear by whom it is gained although there are some strong contenders. The 
question still remains of what will be the outcome of the two reforms and if they will 
become successes or failures. Several authors have argued that it is far from clear what 
will be the outcome of this kind of reform processes (Bleiklie and Byrkjeflot 2002, 
Nowotny et al. 2001). Different institutions may face the same reform with different 
strategies, and different disciplines are affected in very diverse ways by what is 
apparently the same reform.  
One key development in both sectors is the push by government authorities to make 
the sectors more competitive by means of incentive systems that reward efficient 
services for patients and clients. Thus we may be heading towards what we may call a 
competitive regime (Byrkjeflot and Neby 2003), characterized by a government push 
towards a quasi-market dominated by consumer driven arenas and political hierarchies. 
If the reforms result in the intended regime change, the next question is what this may 
entail for the services that are provided by hospitals and higher education institutions. 
However, our analyses so far, indicate that the push towards a competitive regime may 
be severely dampened by a stronger push for more state control. If this is correct we 
may be seeing a move towards stronger political–administrative regimes. This means that 
both the hospital sector and the higher education sector are moving away from political–
professional regimes in which professional communities and political hierarchies are 
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predominant towards a regime where both the state and the market actors (or models) 
may play stronger roles.  
Our observations indicate that there is a number of interesting differences between 
the two sectors which make a comparison of interest. Both reforms have similar 
objectives: strengthen management and provide more customer friendly services. Yet 
the emphasis is different. The hospital reform is primarily a structural reform aiming at 
creating more clearly defined responsibilities between the hospital owner and funding 
source, the state, and those in charge of running them, the regional and local health 
enterprises. The higher education reform is a broader reform that both interfere directly 
with the basic work processes within institutions (in particular the teaching function) 
and with the structural organization of state-institution relationship and internal 
governance structures.  
First considered from a planning perspective, there are a number of paradoxes built 
into both reforms: Both are explicitly aiming at meeting efficiency requirements and 
customer preferences in ways that are clearly contradictory if one tries to meet both 
goals with respect to the same set of services at the same time. The Hospital reform 
plans the activities of hospitals, but does not consider their relations with primary care. 
Furthermore it tries to combine the creation of monopolies with competition. The 
quality reform is unclear about the concept of quality which may be aiming at excellence 
at the rhetorical level, but in its instrumental aspects, such as the funding model, seems 
to be opting for a minimum quality standard. 
The hospital sector seems to have a history that is more clearly characterized by 
conflicts and interest struggle, and a focus on working arrangements. The reform 
process so far has started to exhibit signs which may demonstrate that such conflicts are 
not easily removed by regime change. This may indicate that although a regime change 
has taken place that has enhanced the legitimacy of hospital leadership and enabled 
management to effectively keep internal conflicts out of public view. However public 
conflicts still emerge and the blame game seems to continue, but with new actors as the 
main contenders. In the higher education sector evidence of conflict is also clear. In this 
case it was, in a way that is consistent with prevailing traditions of the sector, 
characterized by a media controversy about the formal status of higher education 
institutions as civil service agencies or public enterprises. This means that major policy 
changes may be implemented without problem, whereas regime change is contested. 
However, it is rather surprising that university professors seem to expect that they will 
have to teach more and accordingly do less research without openly protesting. In 
general they seemed to be in favor of the study program reform. Two mechanisms may 
explain this lack of opposition. They may still have hoped for a substantially increased 
funding lever that will keep the teaching load constant at the individual level. Their 
hopes seem for now to have been vindicated. Alternatively, they may expect that they 
will have the opportunity to work things out independently in a way that will allow them 
to work more or less like before. This means the professors expected that established 
patterns to prevail and that they still would have sufficient autonomy to sustain 
established work practices and avoid heavier teaching loads. 
This brings us to the question of the effect of bureaucratic structures and rule 
following. Whereas the possibility that institutionalized practices might contribute to 
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slowing down or diverting the reform processes are definitely possibilities in both 
sectors, there are clear differences with respect to what we have actually observed. In 
the hospital sector the main bureaucratic obstacles to the reform process stem much 
more clearly from the traditional way the new owner via the Health ministry manages 
hospitals, via rule production and directives, and from rule production at multiple levels. 
In the health sector it is more likely that bureaucratic obstacles are used by members of 
the basic organizational units to limit the impact of unwanted reforms in a bottom up 
process. 
Both sectors have been the subject to reforms where regime changes where 
combined with new policies in order to improve quality and efficiency to better serve 
patients and students. The basic idea in both cases was that regime change should 
promote new policy content. While it is important to emphasize that the evidence we 
have presented is limited and that our assumptions are preliminary, the evidence 
suggests that the relationship between regime characteristics and policy content is quite 
loose. Whereas the hospital sector seems to experience regime change without 
(significant) policy change, the higher education sector may be headed for policy change 
without regime change.  
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